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_______________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Yong Hyon Kim ("Kim") appeals from the judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered on July 19, 1993 by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Kim was convicted in the district court of possessing with the 
intent to distribute six kilograms of methamphetamine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 300 months.  Kim contends that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of drugs 
allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in 
applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of 
justice.  As this is an appeal from a final judgment of the 
district court, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
reject Kim's arguments and will affirm the conviction and the 
sentence imposed. 
 
I. 
 Kim is a thirty-nine-year-old adult male.  He was born 
in Korea but subsequently immigrated with his family to the 
United States at the age of seventeen.  Prior to the occurrence 
of the events that gave rise to the indictment against him, Kim 
had continuously lived in the United States for twelve 
consecutive years and attended South Philadelphia High School. 
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This background indicates, and Kim does not deny, that Kim 
understood and spoke English well during his encounter with the 
police, which is at issue in this appeal.  
 On August 26, 1992, DEA Special Agent Kevin Small 
("Small") observed Kim and his friend, Song Youn ("Youn"), on an 
Amtrak train when it stopped at the Albuquerque station.  This 
Amtrak train normally travels between Los Angeles and Chicago. It 
regularly leaves Los Angeles eastbound during the evening, 
crosses the deserts of Southern California and Arizona during the 
night, and enters New Mexico the following morning.  Shortly 
after noon, the train makes a scheduled stop in Albuquerque.  Law 
enforcement officials believed that this route was employed by 
drug dealers to traffick drugs from Los Angeles back to the 
eastern area.  Small, together with other law enforcement 
officials, was involved in several prior investigations and 
searches on the train in an effort to interdict drugs. 
 During a train stop on August 26, 1992, Small, 
accompanied by Sam Candelaria ("Candelaria"), a local police 
officer on the DEA task force, went to roomette number 12, 
occupied by Kim and Youn.  A roomette in a sleeper car costs more 
than a coach seat and affords somewhat more privacy than other 
accommodations.  Roomette 12, however, was located in a busy area 
of the train.  It was only ten feet from the entrance to the 
sleeper car, next to the luggage storage room, and two feet from 
a stairwell leading to the upper floor of the sleeper car. 
 Small knocked on the door to Roomette 12 and Kim opened 
the door.  Youn was inside with Kim.  Shortly before this time, 
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Small activated a concealed recorder to record any conversation 
that he may have with the occupants of the roomette.  Candelaria 
was working with Small, but was out of sight, having stationed 
himself around the corner of the train corridor.  Small said in a 
polite and conversational tone, "How are you guys doing?  I'm 
with the police department."  Small bent slightly to show his 
badge to Kim and Youn who were seated, then knelt in the hallway. 
At that time Small did not block the doorway or enter the 
roomette.  He remained outside in the hallway in a kneeling 
position.   
 Small began to ask several questions, including their 
point of origin, destination, and place of residence.  Kim 
readily responded to the questions.  Small asked if he could see 
their tickets.  Youn produced two tickets in the name of Yong Kim 
and Terry Park.  While Youn was showing the tickets, Small asked 
how the ride had been.  Youn replied, "Real good."  Small handed 
the tickets back to Youn and thanked him.  Small then inquired if 
they had any photo identification.  Youn said his name was "Park" 
and that he had no picture identification with him, while Kim 
said he had.    
 At that time, several persons walked past in the train 
hallway, talking loudly.  Candelaria, out of sight to Kim and 
Youn, waved a piece of paper at Small to inform him that the 
train reservation was made in the name of "Wonz."  Small asked to 
see the tickets again and handed them back to Youn. 
 Small asked about Kim and Youn's luggage.  He told them 
that he worked for DEA and that DEA had "problems with people on 
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board trains smuggling drugs out of L.A. back East."  He then 
asked, "You guys don't have drugs in your luggage today, do you?" 
Kim answered no.  Small asked, "Would you voluntarily consent for 
me to search?"  Kim readily replied, "Sure."  At that time, 
several persons passed by Roomette 12.  Small then pointed to a 
leather bag and asked if it was Kim's.  Kim answered yes.  Youn 
also offered to move his bags down for Small, but Small stated 
that he wanted to examine the bags one at a time. 
 Upon opening the leather bag, Small found six cans of 
"Naturade All-Natural Vegetable Protein."  They appeared to be 
factory-sealed cans with factory lids which were intact.  Small 
asked what it was and what it was for.  Kim replied that it was 
vegetable protein and that he did not know what it was because he 
"got it for a present."  Small asked where Kim got it.  Kim 
replied, "We bought it in L.A."  Small asked Kim if he was sure 
what the cans contained.  Kim did not say anything.  Youn 
answered, "It's closed."  Small opened one of the cans and asked 
Kim who gave them to him.  Kim replied, "The guy in L.A."  Small 
asked, "What guy?"  There was no answer.  Small then handed the 
can to Candelaria who determined that it contained drugs.  The 
agents then placed Kim and Youn under arrest. 
 Subsequently it was discovered that Kim made at least 
two trips to Los Angeles in an apparent attempt to engage in drug 
trafficking, one in July of 1992, the other in August of 1992 
during which he was arrested.  Kim was then charged with (1) 
possessing with the intent to distribute six kilograms of 
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and (2) 
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conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846.  Before the trial began, Kim made a motion to 
suppress the drugs uncovered by Small, contending that Kim was 
unconstitutionally seized during the encounter with Small and, in 
any event, his consent to search his luggage did not extend to 
the sealed cans in the luggage.  The district court denied the 
motion.  The jury subsequently convicted Kim of the possession 
count, but acquitted him of the conspiracy count.  On appeal, Kim 
primarily challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine.    
 
II. 
 We first address whether an unconstitutional seizure 
occurred when Small encountered Kim.  In reviewing the decision 
of the district court, we apply the clear error standard with 
respect to the factual findings.  See United States v. Coggins, 
986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993).  With respect to the ultimate 
legal question of whether a seizure occurred, we exercise plenary 
review.  Id.  
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this amendment as requiring probable cause for making 
an arrest, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-16, 105 S. 
Ct. 1643, 1646 (1985), and reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity for making an investigative stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968).   
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 With respect to police conduct that falls short of an 
investigative stop, the Supreme Court has made clear that "a 
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches 
an individual and asks a few questions."  Florida v. Bostick, ___ 
U.S. ___, ___, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991).  "Only when the 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [a court] 
conclude that a `seizure' has occurred."  Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  When an encounter is 
consensual, no reasonable suspicion is required.    
  In a line of cases starting with United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-58, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877-79 
(1980), to Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493-508, 103 S. Ct. 
1319, 1321-29 (1983) (plurality opinion) and Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988), the 
Supreme Court indicated that "a seizure occurs when a reasonable 
person would believe that he or she is not `free to leave.'" 
Bostick, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.  Relying on this 
language, Bostick, who was questioned by the police in the 
"cramped confines" of a bus on which he was to travel, argued 
that he was not free to leave and, thus, was seized.  Id. at ___, 
111 S. Ct. at 2384-86.   
 The Supreme Court clarified in Bostick that the "free 
to leave" language makes sense when police attempt to question a 
person who is walking down the street or through an airport lobby 
as in Royer, but not when, for reasons unrelated to the police 
conduct at issue, the defendant is not free to simply walk away. 
8 
Id. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.  Individuals may have to stay in 
their workplace by reason of their employment contract, INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (1984), or 
remain in a seat in the bus that was about to depart, Bostick, 
___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.  Under these circumstances, 
the test is whether a reasonable person would feel free "to 
disregard the police and go about his business," id. at ___, 111 
S. Ct. at 2386, or ultimately "whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise 
terminate the encounter," id. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2387, "taking 
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter," 
id.      
 The location of the encounter at the roomette on a 
train brings this case under the rubric of Bostick.  It is 
therefore our task to decide whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances in the case sub judice, a reasonable person would 
have felt free to decline Small's requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter with him.  In our assessment of the encounter, we 
must accord all factors an appropriate weight rather than treat 
any one factor as dispositive.  
 The encounter at issue in this case began with a polite 
knock at the door of Kim's roomette.  Small was in plain clothes, 
his gun was not visible, nor did he ever display his gun.  When 
Kim responded by opening the door, Small commenced the 
conversation by asking politely how Kim and Youn were doing and 
identifying himself as employed by a police department.  Small 
then requested, "Can I talk to you for a second?"  Without 
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hesitation or equivocation, Kim answered, "Yeah."  The 
conversation went forward in a normal conversational tone. 
Without more, the posture of the encounter indicated that it was 
purely consensual.  Kim, however, argues that several factors 
made this encounter nonconsensual and a seizure in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  We will address these arguments in turn.0 
 Kim argues that a seizure occurred because the 
encounter was in a confined area in a non-public setting, and 
because Small blocked the exit.  Of course, "[w]here the 
encounter takes place is one factor, but it is not the only one." 
                     
0Kim relies primarily on two cases of the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit.  Those two cases involved encounters somewhat 
similar to that at issue in this case where a seizure was found 
in each under a multi-factor balancing test.  See generally 
United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).  The authority of 
these cases is exaggerated by Kim.  In a subsequent case with 
somewhat similar facts, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit itself, sitting in banc, appears to have modified Bloom 
and Ward.  United States v. Little, No. 92-2155, 1994 WL 88834, 
at * 4-5 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 1994) (in banc).  Little held that 
Bloom and Ward were overruled to the extent they established a 
per se rule that any encounter at a train roomette, without a 
specific advisement by the officer that the defendant need not 
answer questions, constituted an unlawful seizure because the 
location of an encounter is not determinative.  Id. at * 1, * 4. 
 Secondly, we note that any persuasive authority of 
those cases is further reduced in this case, by reason of the 
inherently fact-oriented, case by case analysis we must conduct. 
In cases decided before Bloom and Ward, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit found no seizure under strikingly similar 
circumstances.  See, e.g., United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 
1423, 1424-26 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (encounter at the door of a 
roomette in a sleeper); cf. United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 
1113, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (encounter at the door to a 
roomette became an investigative stop only after forceful, 
repeated questioning of Savage).  This being the case, we need 
not specifically reject any of the analysis in Bloom and Ward, 
which addressed different encounters with somewhat different 
factual scenarios. 
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Bostick, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.  Our inquiry is how 
the location of the encounter contributed to a reasonable 
person's belief that he was not free to terminate the encounter. 
   We believe the location of the encounter in this case 
would contribute little to such a belief.  As the Supreme Court 
pointed out, "an individual may decline an officer's request 
without fearing prosecution," id., because "a refusal to 
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure," id.  
The location in itself does not deprive an individual of his 
ability to terminate an encounter; he can reject an invitation to 
talk in a private, as well as a public place.0  See also Little, 
1994 WL 88834, at * 3-5. 
 Nor do we believe a confined area in a train is 
inherently coercive.  Courts have long ago rejected the argument 
that "the narrowness and confinement of a train compartment are 
inherently isolationist, hence coercive."  United States v. 
Brady, 842 F.2d 1313, 1315 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  See also United 
States v. Hoffman, 964 F.2d 21, 23 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (cramped 
conditions alone do not invalidate the otherwise lawful police 
                     
0We note that the district court found the location of the 
encounter was a public place.  Kim argues that it was a private 
place.  We believe the location of the roomette and the bustling 
hallway, as described in the next two paragraphs in this opinion, 
indicate that the district court's finding was not clearly 
erroneous.  We do not need to definitively decide the public or 
private nature of the location in this case, however, because the 
characterization of the location of the encounter as public or 
private is not dispositive as to whether the encounter is 
consensual.  
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conduct); Tavolacci, 895 F.2d at 1424-26; Savage, 889 F.2d at 
1116-17.   
 Moreover, the district court found that Small did not 
in fact block the doorway or exit.  Kim argues that the district 
court's finding is clearly erroneous.  We have reviewed the 
record and conclude that it is not.0  Small testified that he 
knew he was "supposed to [leave] enough room for someone to pass 
by [him]," and that he "was not blocking the door."  App. at 91. 
This testimony was uncontradicted.  Moreover, the door was open 
during the entire encounter.  The roomette was in a well-
trafficked area, only ten feet from the entrance to the sleeper 
car, next to the luggage storage room, and two feet from a 
stairwell leading to the upper floor of the sleeper car.  Voices 
of the passersby could occasionally be heard on the tape. 
Directly across from Kim's roomette was the train conductor's 
room.  The door to that room was open and the conductor was in 
his room during the relevant time period.  The conductor passed 
by in front of Kim's roomette several times to speak to 
passengers in the hallway.  Kim could see the conductor and 
passengers.  Close to Kim's roomette on the same hallway was a 
                     
0We disagree with the dissent's contrary conclusion.  While Kim 
testified that Small leaned "on the side of the door" or in the 
doorway, that testimony, even if taken as true, did not 
contradict the fact that Kim did not block the doorway.  Leaning 
on the side of a door is not the same as blocking the doorway. 
Kim did not say that Small crossed the threshold or leaned inside 
the Roomette.  See Dissent Typescript at 8 (Small did not lean 
"into the compartment.").  Even if Kim had said that Small 
blocked the doorway, we would still have to uphold the finding of 
the district court who is in a better position to evaluate the 
testimony of the witnesses and may have made its decision based 
on the credibility of the witnesses. 
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large family room occupied by four or five people.  Passengers 
inside that room watched and heard the encounter.  Finally, the 
door to Kim's roomette was a sliding door, which Kim could have 
easily closed if he wanted to terminate the conversation. 
   Kim argues that these facts notwithstanding, a 
reasonable person would not feel free to decline to answer 
Small's questions or to shut the door, because "[i]t doesn't take 
much intelligence for a reasonable person to believe that 
shutting the door in the face of such an intruder would be to 
invite more serious intrusion."  Reply Brief for Appellant at 2. 
We disagree.  As the Supreme Court stated, "an individual may 
decline an officer's request without fearing prosecution." 
Bostick, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.  We hold that under 
the facts of this case, a reasonable person would have felt free 
to decline to speak or to terminate his conversation with Agent 
Small.  See id. 
 Kim next argues that he had a higher expectation of 
privacy because he was traveling in a private sleeping 
compartment and that a reasonable person would see his roomette 
as a safe haven, different from the public coach areas of a 
train.  While we recognize the differences between a roomette in 
a sleeper car and a seat in the coach area, we do not believe 
that Kim's expectation of privacy has any overriding importance 
in our analysis as to whether a seizure occurred.  Expectation of 
privacy is significant in the analysis of whether consent or 
probable cause is required for making a search, see, e.g., Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); Katz v. United States, 389 
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U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).  It sheds no light on what is 
consent or a consensual encounter.  As far as consent is 
concerned, one may consent to an encounter in the privacy of his 
own home or in a public square.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S. 
Ct. at 511 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection."); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S. Ct. 
424 (1966) (defendant waived his right to privacy in his home by 
inviting an undercover agent inside).  The high expectation of 
privacy, alone, will not destroy the otherwise consensual nature 
of the encounter.0  See Little, 1994 WL 88834, at * 5 
("expectation of privacy has only a limited relevance").       
 Kim contends that Small asked focused and potentially 
incriminating questions.  When asked such questions, Kim argues, 
"an innocent passenger may well feel obligated to demonstrate 
innocence by cooperation," Brief for Appellant at 28, and "a 
guilty passenger must feel terrorized and trapped," id.  Kim 
points to a question that Small asked: "You guys don't have drugs 
in your luggage today, do you?"  First, we do not believe this 
question was accusational.  The tone of the question in no way 
implied that Small accused or believed that Kim had drugs in his 
possession; it was merely an inquiry.   
 Secondly, what a guilty passenger would feel and how he 
would react are irrelevant to our analysis because "the 
                     
0Kim's argument based on higher expectation of privacy appears to 
be a restatement of his argument based on the location of the 
encounter, which we have rejected above.  Such a factor, as we 
stated, is at most but one factor in our balancing analysis. 
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`reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person." 
Bostick, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.  We do not believe 
an innocent person would feel compelled to cooperate with police 
by some potentially incriminating questions.  In any event, 
potentially incriminating questions are permissible.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Bostick: 
 The dissent reserves its strongest criticism for 
the proposition that police officers can approach 
individuals as to whom they have no reasonable 
suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating 
questions.  But this proposition is by no means novel; 
it has been endorsed by the Court any number of times. 
Terry, Royer, Rodriguez, and Delgado are just a few 
examples.  As we have explained, today's decision 
follows logically from those decisions and breaks no 
new ground.  Unless the dissent advocates overruling a 
long, unbroken line of decisions dating back more than 
20 years, its criticism is not well taken. 
Id.  See also Little, 1994 WL 88834, at 6 ("The asking of 
`incriminating questions' is irrelevant to the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter.").0 
 We therefore hold that potentially incriminating 
questions do not by themselves make an encounter coercive.  In so 
                     
0The dissent cites to several cases decided in or before 1990 
prior to Bostick (1991) for a position contrary to the Bostick 
language as quoted here.  Those cases also conflicted with 
Little.  We follow the Supreme Court language, and not the cases 
cited by the dissent.  See Dissent Typescript at 9-10.  
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ruling, we note that Kim cites to only one question, Brief for 
Appellant at 28, and thus the case does not present the scenario 
of repeated and persistent questioning of an individual, which 
was found to constitute an investigative stop in United States v. 
Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 Kim next argues that Small asked his questions in a 
"blunt" and "direct" manner which contributed to the coerciveness 
of the encounter.  We disagree.  The district court found that 
Small's tone was polite and conversational.  After reading the 
transcripts of the questions and listening to the tapes 
ourselves, we agree with the district court.  Such a tone would 
not cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to 
terminate the encounter. 
  Conceding that Small spoke smoothly and politely, Kim 
focuses on "the type of questions that the agent asked, rather 
than their delivery."  Brief for Appellant at 28-29.  Kim argues 
that the questions themselves conveyed the message that Kim and 
Youn were being accused of carrying drugs.  We do not read the 
questions themselves as indicating any accusation of drug 
possession.  To the extent that Kim's argument rests on the types 
of questions asked, it is a recharacterization of his argument 
that the encounter was a seizure because he was asked 
"potentially incriminating questions," which we have already 
rejected.  
 Kim also bases his seizure theory on the fact that 
Small failed to advise Kim of his right to decline the Agent's 
requests or terminate the encounter.  While such advice may well 
16 
be evidence of the consensual nature of an encounter following 
the advice, the absence of such advice does not necessarily 
eliminate the consensual nature of the encounter.  As the Supreme 
Court stated, "[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police 
request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told 
they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual 
nature of the response."  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S. Ct. at 
1762-63.  A reasonable person is presumed to know of his right 
not to answer questions without fear of prosecution.  See 
Bostick, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.  Courts have 
clearly rejected the "attempt to Mirandize [F]ourth [A]mendment 
consents."  United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973)).  As a result, we believe that the 
failure to advise Kim of his right to terminate the conversation 
itself did not make the encounter unconstitutional. 
 To the extent that the number of police officers and 
the individuals present during the encounter has any relevance to 
our analysis, as the court believed in Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1454 
(two agents versus one private citizen), and in Ward, 961 F.2d at 
1531-32 (defendant was alone), we hold that this factor militates 
in favor of the government in this case.  During the entire 
encounter, Small appeared to Kim to be alone, while Kim was 
accompanied by his friend Youn who was present with him.  Another 
police officer was out of sight to both Kim and Youn. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we reject Kim's 
contentions.  After reading the transcript of the conversation 
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between Kim and Small, and listening to the tone of the tape 
recording of that conversation, we believe the encounter was not 
coercive.  The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that 
Kim voluntarily answered Small's questions, and was cooperative 
during the entire encounter.0  Furthermore, we cannot say the 
district court's finding that Agent Small did not block the 
doorway during questioning is clearly erroneous.  We therefore 
conclude that the encounter was consensual and did not produce 
tainted fruit inadmissible at trial. 
 
III. 
 Kim contends that his encounter with the police was a 
seizure and therefore his consent to search was tainted by that 
seizure.  Brief for Appellant at 35-37.  As we conclude that Kim 
was not seized during the encounter, Kim's contention of taint 
naturally fails.  Still, we feel it appropriate to examine 
separately whether the district court erred in finding that Kim 
voluntarily consented to the search of Kim's luggage.  The 
district court's determination of consent to search the luggage 
is a finding of fact, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. 
                     
0The dissent faults us for analyzing several factors in 
isolation.  To the contrary, we base our conclusion that the 
encounter was voluntary on all of the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter including Small's manner and tone and Kim's 
voluntary responses to Small.  The dissent itself describes a 
typical Small encounter as follows:  "[Small] makes no threats. 
His tone is polite and conversational.  He does not show a gun. 
He behaves much like a door-to-door salesman who can keep his 
foot in the door and the prospect talking until he has made a 
sale (or in Small's business, an arrest)."  Dissent Typescript at 
2 n.1. 
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at 2047-48, and is subject only to clearly erroneous review. See, 
e.g., Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1093.  We find no clear error in this 
case.     
 It is well settled that the government may undertake a 
search without a warrant or probable cause if an individual 
consents to the search, and any evidence discovered during such a 
search may be seized and admitted at trial.  Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 219, 93 S. Ct. at 2043-44 (1973).  Our task is to decide 
whether Kim consented to the search of his luggage. 
 As the Supreme Court instructed, "[w]hen a prosecutor 
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, 
he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, 
freely and voluntarily given."  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 
S. Ct. at 2045 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
"[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact `voluntary' or was 
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances."  Id. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2047-48.  Thus whether 
consent was given is to be resolved by examining all relevant 
factors, without giving dispositive effect to any single 
criterion.  Certain factors that courts consider in determining 
whether confessions were voluntary, such as the age of the 
accused, his education, his intelligence, whether he was advised 
of his constitutional rights, and whether the questioning was 
repeated and prolonged, id. at 226, 93 S. Ct. at 2047, are 
relevant to our examination.  See United States v. Velasquez, 885 
19 
F.2d 1076, 1081-83 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017, 
110 S. Ct. 1321 (1990).   
 While not giving an exhaustive list of relevant 
factors, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth did teach that "[w]hile 
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be 
taken into account, the government need not establish such 
knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent." 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048.  Nor is the 
government required to advise the defendant of his right to 
refuse consent before eliciting his consent.  Id. at 231-34, 93 
S. Ct. at 2049-51. 
   Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we 
hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that 
Kim consented to the search of his luggage.  The tape recording 
of the conversation between Small and Kim and the transcript of 
that recording indicate Kim spoke English well and answered 
Small's questions without hesitation.  Kim had been a permanent 
resident alien in the United States for over twelve years and 
attended high school in Philadelphia.   
  Most important, when Small asked if Kim would 
voluntarily consent to a search of his luggage, Kim readily 
responded, "Sure."  App. at 34.  During the entire short 
conversation, Kim was cooperative.  He readily confirmed to Small 
the identity of his luggage.  Kim's demeanor was no doubt a 
strong indication of voluntariness.  Even his travel companion 
Song Youn testified that Kim was not at all reluctant to permit 
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Small to search his luggage, and that Kim readily consented to 
the search.  App. at 304. 
 Moreover, the whole encounter was short, lasting only 
several minutes.  There was no threat of force against Kim. Small 
was the only officer visible to Kim and Youn.  Nor was the 
atmosphere coercive.  Small was polite and his tone was courteous 
and conversational.  There was no repeated and prolonged 
questioning.  Nor did Small ask Kim direct, probing, or 
incriminating questions.  During the entire period, Small 
mentioned only that he was looking for illegal drugs.  That was 
not a probing or incriminating question; it was meant to inform 
Kim of Small's mission and the scope of his search so as not to 
mislead Kim.  In any event, such questioning alone is not 
dispositive under a totality of circumstances analysis.  It 
certainly does not outweigh the overwhelming evidence of 
voluntariness as analyzed above.  Nor do we believe it 
significant that Kim was not advised of his right to refuse 
consent, particularly in the face of strong evidence of 
voluntariness.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-33, 93 S. Ct. at 
2048-50; Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1093. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
district court was correct in finding that Kim voluntarily 
consented to the search of his luggage.         
  
IV. 
 Kim also contends that his consent to the search of his 
luggage did not extend to the search of the sealed containers 
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within one of his bags, and therefore the drugs found in those 
containers are inadmissible.  We reject this argument. 
 It is clear that "[w]hen an official search is properly 
authorized--whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid 
warrant--the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its 
authorization."  Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100 
S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1980).  "The standard for measuring the scope 
of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 
`objective' reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect?"  Florida v. Jimeno, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S. Ct. 
1801, 1803-04 (1991).  Applied to the case sub judice, the 
inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have understood the 
exchange between Small and Kim as indicating that Kim's 
authorization to search his luggage for drugs included permission 
to search the sealed cans placed inside his luggage.  
 We therefore examine the exchange between Small and Kim 
to determine what a reasonable person would understand the scope 
of the consent to be.  Before starting the search, Small informed 
Kim and his friend Sung Youn that he worked for DEA and was 
looking for illegal drugs, and asked if they had any drugs in 
their luggage.  After that Small asked him, "Would you 
voluntarily consent for me to search?"  App. at 34.  Kim 
responded, "Sure."  Id.  Kim then identified one of his bags for 
Small.  Upon opening the bag, Small discovered some cans.  Small 
asked what was in the cans and what it was for.  Kim said it was 
vegetable protein.  Small asked whether Kim was sure that the 
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cans contained vegetable protein.  Kim said nothing.  Youn said, 
"It's closed," and repeated it.  App. at 35.  Small proceeded to 
open the can and Agent Candelaria subsequently determined that 
the cans contained methamphetamine.  Kim and Youn were then 
arrested. 
 We conclude that a reasonable person would understand 
Kim's authorization for a search of his luggage to include 
permission to search any items found inside his luggage.  Common 
sense supports this understanding.  Small indicated that he was 
looking for illegal drugs, and his search target was the luggage. 
Kim gave his permission for Small to search his luggage for 
drugs.  Cans such as those found in Kim's luggage may be thought 
by a reasonable person to contain drugs.  Thus the permission to 
search the luggage covered the cans found in that luggage.  
 The ruling of the Supreme Court in Jimeno, ___ U.S. at 
___, 111 S. Ct. at 1803-04, a case analogous to the one before 
us, lends support to our conclusion.  In Jimeno, the Supreme 
Court held that "it was objectively reasonable for the police to 
conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car 
included consent to search containers within that car which might 
bear drugs.  A reasonable person may be expected to know that 
narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container." Id. 
at 1804. 
 Kim attempts to distinguish this case from Jimeno by 
pointing out that the search was conducted around a sleeping 
compartment on a train rather than in a car as in Jimeno, and 
that the drugs in this case were contained in sealed cans rather 
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than in a bag simply folded as in Jimeno.  We conclude that these 
distinctions do not defeat the principle underlying the Jimeno 
ruling that when one gives general permission to search for drugs 
in a confined area, that permission extends to any items within 
that area that a reasonable person would believe to contain 
drugs.   
 We believe that the place where the encounter took 
place is not significant because it did not operate to coerce 
Kim, as we have analyzed above, to give his general permission to 
search his luggage.  Moreover, the distinction between the sealed 
cans in this case and the folded bags in Jimeno does not mandate 
a different result because they both are what a reasonable person 
would believe could function as drug containers.  To repeat the 
language of the Supreme Court, "a reasonable person may be 
expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some 
form of a container."  Id. 
 We note that the Supreme Court indicated that "[i]t is 
very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting 
to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a 
locked briefcase within the trunk."  Id.  However, cans such as 
those found in the case sub judice are not similar to locked 
briefcases.  We therefore reject the argument based on the above 
language of the Supreme Court addressing a different matter.  We 
draw support from United States v. Springs, 936 F.2d 1330, 1334-
35 (D.C. Cir. 1991), where the court upheld the search of a 
sealed baby powder container.   The court there rejected an 
argument almost identical to Kim's:  
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the evidence supports a view that the opening of the 
baby powder container did not depend upon possession of 
a key, knowledge of a combination, or anything other 
than merely removing its lid.  Neither did the fact of 
its opening render it useless, anymore than the opening 
of the folds destroyed the usefulness of the paper bag 
in Jimeno. 
 
Id. at 1334-35.  The same scenario occurred in this case and we 
follow the reasoning of Springs. 
 Finally, Kim contends that after Small obtained general 
permission to search Kim's luggage, he should have also asked for 
specific permission to search each bag and, more importantly, for 
permission to open the cans when Small discovered them in Kim's 
luggage.0  Such an argument for more explicit and specific 
authorization has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Jimeno. 
The Court stated that if a suspect's consent "would reasonably be 
understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth 
                     
0Upon opening the bag, Small discovered some cans.  The following 
colloquy ensued: 
SMALL: What is this stuff? 
 KIM:  Vegetable protein. 
 SMALL: What do you use it for? 
 KIM:  I don't know.  I got it for -- 
 YOUN: For health. 
 KIM:  -- a present. 
 SMALL: A prisent?  A present!  Who gave it to you, 
you know? 
 KIM:  We bought it in L.A.  Coffee, and these. 
 SMALL: Okay.  You're sure that's what's inside one 
of these? 
 YOUN: It's closed. 
 SMALL: Huh? 
 YOUN: It's closed. 
 SMALL: It's closed? 
  
App. at 34-35.  
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Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit 
authorization."  Jimeno, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.  
  We have already concluded above that Kim's consent to 
search his luggage for drugs extended to the cans in the luggage. 
Of course Kim could have limited his consent to certain items, 
but he had the burden to express that limitation, id., which he 
did not do.  Kim readily gave his general consent to the search, 
without hesitation or limitation.  Even Youn subsequently 
testified that Kim was not at all reluctant to permit Small to 
search his bags.  App. at 304.   
 The fact that Youn said, "It's closed," App. at 35, 
does not help Kim.  It is worth emphasizing that Youn, not Kim, 
said those words.  Kim, who gave general authorization to search 
and readily identified his own luggage for Small, said nothing. 
Therefore, it was reasonable for Small to conclude that Kim, who 
bore the burden to limit his own permission, did not attempt to 
impose any limitations on his general permission.  After all, 
Youn, who was not Kim's guardian, would not be considered by a 
reasonable person to be able to legally limit Kim's consent.   
 More important, Youn's words would not be understood by 
a reasonable person as a limitation on Kim's consent because Youn 
spoke those words not in an attempt to limit the search, but 
rather in response to Small's question, "You're sure that's 
what's inside one of these?"  Id.  Youn's answer was another way 
of saying, "I don't know because it is closed."   Accordingly, 
Kim did not limit his general consent to search to any specific 
items.  For the foregoing reasons, we hold that it was reasonable 
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for Small to conclude that Kim's consent to search extended to 
the cans found in his luggage. 
 
V. 
 Finally, Kim argues that the district court erred in 
upwardly adjusting his sentence by applying a two-level 
enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§3C1.1.  That provision mandates a two-level enhancement "[i]f 
the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense."  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.   This provision applies to false 
statements made during a defendant's cooperation with law 
enforcement authorities.  See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 964 
F.2d 687, 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 
470 (1992). 
  The facts that led the district court to make the two 
level upward adjustment essentially related to Kim's conduct 
during his cooperation with the government.  Shortly after he was 
arrested, Kim decided to cooperate with DEA.  Deliberately 
concealing his first trip to Los Angeles in July 1992, Kim told 
the agents that the August 1992 trip during which he was arrested 
was his only trip to Los Angeles.  He further informed the DEA 
agents that he had been asked to bring the cans back to 
Philadelphia as a gift, and that someone was supposed to meet him 
at the train station or to pick them up at his house.  He offered 
to assist DEA to deliver the methamphetamine to the intended 
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recipient in Philadelphia.  The DEA agents attempted to stage a 
controlled delivery by placing Kim back in the original train. No 
one showed up to meet Kim.  The evidence revealed that by that 
time Kim had already called his employer's home to inform them of 
his arrest and his cooperation with DEA.  Based on these facts, 
Kim claims that there is no evidence of willful obstruction. 
Furthermore, Kim argues, even if there was obstruction, it did 
not relate to the "instant offense," possession of 
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, of which he was 
convicted, but related solely to the conspiracy charge of which 
he was acquitted.  
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992). We 
review the factual findings of the district court for clear 
error, id., and "where the district court's finding involves a 
mixed question of law and fact, our standard and scope of review 
takes on greater scrutiny, approaching de novo review as the 
issue moves from one of strictly fact to one of strictly law." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 We first address the threshold question of whether the 
facts that the district court relied upon to apply the upward 
adjustment related to the "instant offense" within the meaning of 
the Guidelines.  The language of the guideline indicates that 
"instant offense" refers to the particular offense of which the 
defendant was convicted of.  "Any interpretation other than that 
§ 3C1.1 refers to efforts to obstruct the prosecution of the 
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conviction offense would only render this modifier meaningless." 
United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1991), 
quoted in Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 967.  Accord, e.g., United 
States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission's own interpretation 
supports this reading of the guideline.  As we pointed out, 
"[t]he commentary to section 3C1.1 makes it clear that the 
section's focus is on willful acts or statements intended to 
obstruct or impede the government's investigation of the offense 
at issue."  Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 968.  Accordingly, in order 
for the district court to apply a two-level upward adjustment, 
the facts showing Kim's obstruction must relate to the offense of 
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, of 
which he was convicted, or its investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing. 
 Kim contends that the facts that arguably constituted 
obstruction of justice at most pertained only to the conspiracy 
count of which he was acquitted, rather than the possession 
count.  His argument is that the possession offense was complete 
in Albuquerque because "[t]he government took the drugs and Kim's 
possession ended."  Brief for Appellant at 48.  His allegedly 
false cooperation with the government was useful only to catch 
certain third parties, so the argument goes, and was included 
solely in the charged conspiracy of which he was acquitted.   
 We disagree.  While it is clear that Kim's false 
cooperation related to the conspiracy charge, that fact alone 
does not necessarily demonstrate that his conduct could not also 
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relate to the possession count.  Viewing the indictment and the 
facts as a whole, we conclude that Kim's false cooperation 
related to the possession charge of which Kim was convicted.  The 
possession offense may well have stopped when the government took 
the drugs from Kim.  But the "investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing" of that offense did not stop at that point.         
 The possession offense of which Kim was charged and 
convicted has three elements:  (1) Kim's possession of six 
kilograms of the methamphetamine; (2) his knowledge that the 
substance he possessed was a controlled substance; and (3) his 
intent to distribute the controlled substance.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§841(a)(1).  The government had the burden of proving every 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.  In order to carry that 
burden, the government must conduct a thorough investigation of 
every fact that related to those three elements.  The 
government's investigation of other participants in the scheme 
directly bore upon two elements of the offense: Kim's knowledge 
that the substance in the cans was a controlled substance and his 
intent to distribute. 
   In particular, Kim's material misstatements about other 
participants and his trip to California in July of 1992 related 
to his knowledge of methamphetamine in the cans.  In order to 
prove Kim's knowledge, the government may have needed to prove 
how the methamphetamine came into Kim's possession and, thus, 
needed accurate information regarding the events preceding the 
encounter in front of the train roomette on August 26, 1992.  The 
evidence shows that Kim deliberately provided false and 
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inaccurate information with respect to his contact and his trip 
to Los Angeles in July of 1992. 
 To prove the intent to distribute element, the 
government may have needed to identify who was waiting for the 
methamphetamine.  Kim deliberately called the home of his 
employer Kenneth Lee (also known as Kwang Suk Yi), warning him of 
his cooperation with the government, thus tipping off the 
intended recipient of the methamphetamine.  Of course, this 
obstructed the government's investigation of the intent element: 
no one actually showed up to receive the methamphetamine from 
Kim.  Accordingly, the facts upon which the district court based 
the two-level enhancement were intimately related to 
investigation and prosecution of two elements of the possession 
offense and therefore related to the "instant offense" within the 
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.    
 We next address the issue of whether there is evidence 
of willful obstruction.  The language of § 3C1.1 plainly requires 
that upward adjustment be based only on willful obstruction of 
justice.  Willful obstruction includes "providing a materially 
false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly 
obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution 
of the instant offense."  Id. comment. (n.3(g)).   
 Willfulness denotes "an act which is intentional rather 
than accidental."  Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 965  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In the context of applying § 3C1.1 in 
a sentencing determination, the evidence must show that the 
defendant "intentionally obstructed or attempted to obstruct 
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justice."  Id.   Since the government sought to upwardly adjust 
Kim's sentence, it bore the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Kim willfully obstructed or attempted to 
obstruct justice.  Id. 
 Kim argues that the district court erred in failing to 
make a specific factual finding of willful obstruction, which 
failure warrants a remand.  We read the record differently. 
During the sentencing hearing, the district court specifically 
stated that the court imposed the sentence on Kim for his serious 
criminal conduct and his "subsequent misleading of the 
Government's investigation by not telling the truth or appearing 
to help them [sic] when he, in fact, was not doing this."  App. 
at 612.  This language indicates that the district court found 
that Kim intentionally misled the government in order to thwart 
the investigation.  Read in the context of the sentencing 
hearing, and coupled with the evidence of Kim's false cooperation 
and misstatements in the record, the district court's statement 
more than constituted a finding of willful obstruction of 
justice.   
  Kim next argues that there was no evidence to support 
the finding of the district court.  We disagree.  The district 
court made its finding of Kim's misleading the government's 
investigation only after reviewing the pre-sentencing report and 
hearing arguments from both parties.  See App. at 589-612.  The 
record reflects that the government proved Kim's deliberate false 
statements to the government agents.  The district court 
certainly did not clearly err.   
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 First, Kim deliberately concealed his first trip to Los 
Angeles in July of 1992 when the methamphetamine shipment was 
due.  Kim admitted to lying about his trip in order to shift the 
focus of the government investigation away from him.  App. at 
382.  Kim also deliberately misled the government about the 
identity of the individual who delivered to him the cans 
containing the methamphetamine.  As mentioned above, these 
falsehoods directly related to and impeded the investigation of 
one of the elements of the possession count:  Kim's knowledge of 
the controlled substance contained in the cans. 
 Second, the record also supports the finding of the 
district court that Kim deliberately misled the government's 
investigation as to who would be the intended recipient of the 
cans of methamphetamine which directly related to the intent to 
distribute element of Kim's possession charge.  Kim contends that 
there was no direct evidence that Kim willfully obstructed the 
investigation.  The district court, however, indicated that it 
could infer willfulness from the course of Kim's conduct during 
the sham cooperation.  App. at 593.  We have reviewed the record 
and conclude that the district court's inference was not clear 
error.   
 The record reveals that Kim made several 
misrepresentations to the government agents during the course of 
his alleged cooperation with the government in order to assist 
the government in catching the intended recipient of the drug. He 
misled the agents into believing that he would assist them in 
effecting a controlled delivery in Philadelphia.  On the pretext 
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of calling his home to find out whether his wife had given birth 
to their child, Kim called Lee and informed Lee's wife that he 
was cooperating with DEA, knowing that this would tip off the 
intended recipient.  In his subsequent testimony, Kim conceded 
that because of this disclosure, "everybody" knew about the 
situation.  App. at 390.   
 Kim first told the agents that the recipient would come 
to the train station or his home.  But at the last minute while 
staying at a hotel with the agents, he changed his story.  Then 
Kim said that the recipient would contact him through a beeper, 
which was at his home.  Kim then called his home and asked his 
brother-in-law to bring his beeper for him to use.  Shortly 
afterwards, his brother-in-law, accompanied by Kenneth Lee, 
brought the beeper to the hotel room.  Kim told the agents that 
Lee spoke only Korean (when he in fact spoke English) and 
proceeded to speak with him in Korean which the agents did not 
understand.  Subsequently no one showed up to pick up the cans of 
methamphetamine. 
 From this factual scenario, the district court was 
entitled, we conclude, to find that Kim intentionally obstructed 
the government's investigation of the intended recipient of the 
methamphetamine which related to Kim's intent to distribute the 
drug.  The district court found that Kim probably manipulated the 
timing of his story of the pager to bring Lee to the hotel in 
order to assure him that Kim was acting as if he was cooperating, 
but in fact was not.  Clearly if Kim simply wanted the beeper, he 
could have asked his brother-in-law to bring it to the hotel, 
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alone, without enlisting the help of Lee.  Although there was no 
direct evidence of the conversation between Lee and Kim, the 
district court's inference was not clearly erroneous.   
 We are aware of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 
stating that "testimony or statements should be evaluated in a 
light most favorable to the defendant."  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 
comment. (n.1).  Nonetheless, we conclude that the entire course 
of conduct of Kim's false cooperation with the government amply 
supports the finding of the district court.  In this context, we 
must bear in mind that the government's burden is not to prove 
its position beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 965.     
 Kim finally contends that he called Lee not to tip off 
the intended recipient, but to pay "the courtesy of a telephone 
call," Brief for Appellant at 46, to his employer.  He asserts 
this was "within the norm for a defendant who has just been 
arrested and has made an important decision to assist the 
government," id.  With this argument, Kim attempts to explain 
away his willfulness to impede the investigation. 
 We reject this version of what occurred.  The district 
court believed, and we agree, that a truly cooperating defendant 
would not undermine the cooperation.  Although it may be 
reasonable for a defendant to inform his family and employer that 
he will not be home as scheduled, it was not necessary for Kim to 
disclose that he was cooperating with the government.  He had 
several other options.  Instead, he chose to call his employer 
under the pretext of calling his wife to inquire about the birth 
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of their child.  Had he been forthright about calling his 
employer, the agents may have attempted to stop him.  More 
important, Kim disclosed in the phone call that he was 
cooperating with the government, knowing that the information 
would be made known to others.  Kim must have known that the 
effect of his call would be to tip off the intended recipient of 
the drugs of the danger of being caught if he came to meet Kim. 
These facts rendered Kim's explanation not credible.  The 
district court did not clearly err in inferring that Kim 
willfully impeded the investigation.  
 Accordingly, we conclude that Kim willfully obstructed 
the investigation and prosecution of the instant offense within 
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and that the district court's 
finding of willful obstruction is supported by the record.  The 
district court did not err in applying a two-level upward 
adjustment in Kim's sentence for obstruction of justice. 
 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in all 
respects the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the 
district court.  
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 This appeal presents two discrete Fourth Amendment issues.  They are both close 
but, with all respect, I believe that the majority has gotten them both wrong.  First, I 
believe that the facts taken as a whole show that a reasonable person in defendant Kim's 
position would not have felt free to terminate the encounter and hence that there was a 
seizure.  More specifically, a seizure occurred because Agent Small confronted Kim in a 
non-public part of the train, blocked Kim's exit from the roomette, asked Kim focused and 
incriminating questions, and never advised Kim that he had a right to terminate the 
encounter. As I see it, at the time Small asked Kim whether he had drugs in his luggage, 
Small had seized him.  And since Small had no reasonable suspicion at the time he detained 
Kim, the consent Kim gave to search his luggage was involuntary.  Second, I think that 
even if the majority is right that Small had not seized Kim and that Kim's consent to the 
search of his luggage was thus voluntary, Small exceeded the scope of Kim's consent when 
he opened one of the sealed Naturade All-Natural Vegetable Protein canisters he found in 
Kim's luggage.  I would therefore hold that the motion to suppress should have been 
granted and that the convictions should be overturned.   
I. THE SEIZURE 
 I agree with the majority that the seizure question in this case falls under the 
rule of Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), which tells us that a 
person has been seized if, under the totality of the circumstances, a "reasonable person 
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."  
111 S. Ct. at 2387.0  A review of the circumstances surrounding the encounter between 
                     
0The encounter between Kim and Small occurred in a sleeper car on an AMTRAK train called 
the "Southwest Chief," which travels between Los Angeles and Chicago.  Agent Small (along 
with Officer Candelaria) has become something of a legend among the district judges in New 
Mexico and the appellate judges in the Tenth Circuit.  His drug interdiction efforts at 
the Albuquerque train station have singlehandedly spawned an entire jurisprudence about 
searches and seizures on trains.  No fewer than nine published opinions in that circuit, 
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Small and Kim, however, shows that a reasonable person would not have felt free to 
terminate the encounter. 
 To begin with, the encounter occurred in a train roomette, a non-public sett
The non-public nature of the setting is a factor that weighs in favor of a conclusion that 
a seizure occurred because police conduct in non-public areas tends to be more coercive.  
See United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "whether an 
encounter occurs in the public view is particularly significant" to the question of 
whether a seizure occurred).  See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438, 104 S. Ct. 
3138, 3149 (1984) (expressly recognizing the importance of an encounter occurring in a 
public place).0 
                                                                                          
including an en banc opinion, grapple with the Fourth Amendment issues raised by his 
actions.  See United States v. Moore, 1994 WL 131523 (10th Cir. April 18, 1994); Unit
States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc); United States v. Zapata, 997 
F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hall, 978 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526 
(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Miller, 811 F. Supp. 1485 (D.N.M. 1993); United States v. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. 1551 
(D.N.M. 1991).   
 Based on these reported cases, Small's method of operation is distinctive and 
apparently always essentially the same.  Before the "Southwest Chief" stops in Albuquerque 
during its run between Los Angeles and Chicago, he reviews the train manifest looking for 
passengers travelling in sleeping cars on one-way tickets paid for with cash.  When he 
finds such a passenger, he knocks on the passenger's roomette door, stands in the doorway 
and begins a carefully constructed inquisition that quickly leads to the question "Would 
you voluntarily consent for me to search."  He makes no threats.  His tone is polite and 
conversational.  He does not show a gun.  He behaves much like a door-to-door salesman who 
can keep his foot in the door and the prospect talking until he has made a sale (or, in 
Small's business, an arrest).  He is an enormously capable and highly successful police 
officer.  But his arrests have not always been upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge 
and, at all events, we must analyze the facts of this case on their own. 
0
 The majority opinion in the recent Tenth Circuit en banc case discussing Small, 
United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), questioned the 
assumption that a non-public encounter makes the police conduct more coercive than when it 
occurs in a public setting.  Id. at 1504 & n.5.  It stated, not unpersuasively, that many 
people may in fact feel more coerced when they are confronted in a public setting and may 
submit to police requests because they do not want to make a spectacle of themselves.  
 Although the Little majority's view on this question has intuitive appeal, it 
does not appear to be in accord with the view of the Supreme Court.  As Judge Logan 
pointed out in dissent in Little, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated in the context 
of giving Miranda warnings that public settings are inherently less coercive.  Little
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 The district court's finding that the setting was public was, in my opinion, 
clearly erroneous.  Although someone renting a roomette probably does not have the same 
expectation of privacy as someone sitting in his or her home, a roomette passenger's 
expectation of privacy is certainly much higher than a coach passenger's.  In my view, the 
privacy expectation is quite similar to that of an individual who has rented a hotel room, 
and it is well settled that a hotel room is a non-public place.  See Stoner v. California
376 U.S. 483, 489-90, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964) (according full Fourth Amendment 
protection to hotel guests); Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 
1960) ("The transience of appellant's stay in the [hotel] room searched by the officers 
does not dilute the force of constitutional protection.  The hotel room in question was 
appellant's dwelling.  That he lived there for but several days is of no consequence.").
 Moreover, Stoner has been extended beyond hotel rooms to cover other temporary 
dwelling places.  See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1993) (tent 
pitched in public campground was non-public place entitled to same protection as a hotel 
room).  Courts have also recognized higher expectations of privacy in private living 
quarters on ships.  See United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The 
private living quarters [of a ship] are at least analogous to a private dwelling.  As a 
result, even in the context of a border search, the search of private living quarters on a 
ship should require something more than naked suspicion.").  These cases suggest that a 
                                                                                          
F.3d at 1511 (Logan, J. dissenting) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 
3149).  In Berkemer, the Supreme Court said: 
  
[t]he typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree.  Passersby, on 
foot or in other cars, witness the interaction of officer and motorist.  This 
exposure to public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policemen to 
use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes 
the motorists fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to 
abuse. 
 
468 U.S. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 3149.  Until the Supreme Court states otherwise, therefore, 
we must operate under the assumption that encounters with the police in non-public 
settings are inherently more coercive.            
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place set aside for sleeping in private carries with it a much higher expectation of 
privacy and should be considered a non-public place.  Cf. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 
99, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (1990) ("We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep 
because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings.  It is for
this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in 
our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or 
the home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a 
telephone booth -- 'a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of 
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.'" (quoting Katz v. United States
U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 517 (1967) (Harlan, J concurring))); United States v. Eagon
707 F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Those living on their boats have a greater expectation 
of privacy at night."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992, 104 S. Ct. 483 (1983).  I believe that 
a train roomette, an enclosed cabin with a bed and a sink, is no less a temporary dwelling 
place than a pitched tent in a campground, a private berth on a ship, or a hotel room.  
 Of course a conductor can enter the roomette at different times during the trip.  
But the fact that a conductor may enter to check tickets or in case of an emergency, and 
that an attendant may enter to make the bed and clean up the room the next morning, does 
not lower the expectation of privacy a passenger has in the roomette with respect to 
entries into the roomette for purposes totally unrelated to those duties of the train 
crew.  The right of access to the hotel room by managers and housekeepers, for example, 
does not transform the hotel room into a public place.  See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489
S. Ct. at 893 (noting that although a person engaging a hotel room gives permission to 
maids, janitors or repairmen to enter the room in the performance of their duties, such 
permission does not give police license to enter to search for incriminating evidence); 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616, 81 S. Ct. 776, 780 (1961) (explaining that 
although a landlord had actual authority to enter into a house to "view [a tenant's] 
waste" and gave his permission to search, the police violated a tenant's constitutional 
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right when they searched the tenant's house since the search was unrelated to viewing 
waste).  I see no reason why this principle should not apply with equal force in the train 
roomette setting. 
 It is also virtually undisputed that the roomette was a cramped and confined 
setting.  The roomette, which was seven feet wide and less than four feet deep, was 
similar to a moderately sized walk-in closet.  The only access to and from the roomette 
was through a door that was only two feet wide.  The hallway outside the doorway was 
itself only two and a half feet wide. Such cramped confines increase the coercive nature 
of the encounter, making it less likely that a reasonable person would feel free to 
terminate it.  Cf. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 ("The cramped confines of 
a bus are one relevant factor that should be considered in evaluating whether a 
passenger's consent is voluntary."). 
 Making the encounter in the cramped and confined space even more coercive was 
the fact that Small blocked Kim's only means of exit.  Kim argues, and I agree, that the 
district court's finding that Small did not block the doorway is clearly erroneous.  Small 
claimed that he was kneeling five to six inches from the door during much of the encounter 
(the district court accepted this testimony, finding that he had been five inches from the 
door).  For Kim to have terminated the encounter by leaving the roomette would have 
required him to vault over Small, through a two foot doorway into approximately 30 inches 
of landing space (really somewhat less because Small's body would have occupied a 
considerable part of the hallway).  I think it is inconceivable that a reasonable person 
would have felt free to ignore Small by passing over him into the narrow hallway where 
Small knelt during the encounter.  Cf. United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1116 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (stating that blocking the door would have been relevant to the question of 
seizure because it would have prevented defendant from leaving the compartment). 
 Of course, it might be argued that Kim could have terminated the encounter 
simply by shutting the door.  If so, it might not matter whether Small blocked Kim's exit 
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from the train. But I do not think a reasonable person would think they could terminate 
the encounter with the police by slamming a door in the officer's face.  See Savage
F.2d at 1116 (saying nothing about whether the defendant could shut the door).  Indeed I 
am not sure that it matters much to the inquiry whether Kim had alternative methods of 
terminating the encounter other than exiting the train for the fact that Small may have 
left Kim a variety of ways of terminating the encounter does not mean that a reasonable 
person would have felt free to use them.  For example, a seizure would certainly have 
occurred had Small entered into the roomette and shut the door behind him regardless of 
whether Kim could have terminated the encounter by some other means like telling Small to 
go away, or climbing out a window.   
 In any event, I do not believe that Kim could have shut the door during the 
encounter.  The findings the district court made about the configuration of the train car, 
about the traffic passing up and down the hallway, and Small's claim that he left room for 
the passengers walking up and down the hallway, make it virtually certain that Small 
leaned inside the room for important periods of time during the episode and thus prevented 
the door from being shut.   
 The majority tries to avoid this problem by stating that Small's testimony that 
he "was not blocking the door" was uncontradicted.  This assertion is simply incorrect.  
Both Youn and Kim testified that Small was leaning against the side of the doorway, indeed 
leaning against the door itself.  Youn testified that Small was "definitely in the 
doorway" and Kim testified "He was kind of leaning through the doorway -- not into the 
compartment.  He was leaning on the side of the door." 
 In my opinion, both Youn's and Kim's testimony that Small was leaning against 
the doorway throughout the encounter is inherently credible because:  1) leaning against 
the doorway would be the natural way to conduct a conversation with anyone sitting in the 
roomette; 2) it would allow Small the ability to conceal the fact that he was passing 
things to Candelaria throughout the encounter; 3) and it would allow other passengers to 
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pass freely down the hallway.  By contrast, I believe Small's testimony that he was five 
to six inches from the door is incredible because 1) if Small really had been five to six 
inches outside the roomette, there would not have been enough room for people to pass 
without at least acknowledging Small, and nowhere does the tape record an "excuse me" or 
similar statement by even a single passenger passing Small in the corridor;0 and 2) given 
the large amount of noise in the train at the time, it seems doubtful that Kim could have 
even heard Small's "polite and conversational" voice had Small stayed five to six inches 
outside the roomette. 
 Not only did the encounter occur in a non-public, confined setting with Small 
blocking the only means of exit, but Small also asked Kim and Youn focussed and 
potentially incriminating questions.  Small first asked them about their citizenship 
status.  Apparently, the sight of two Asian men travelling to Philadelphia from Los 
Angeles made Small think that they might be illegal aliens, and no doubt his questions 
communicated these thoughts to Kim.  He then asked them "[y]ou guys don't have any drugs 
in your luggage today, do you?"  By asking this after looking over their tickets twice and 
informing them that he was a DEA agent on the train looking for drug traffickers, Small 
communicated the message that Kim was a specific target of the agent's investigation.  At 
least two courts have found that a seizure occurred when an officer asked similar 
questions of a suspect.  See United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(seizure occurred as soon as agent told defendant that he was part of a narcotics unit and 
was trying to stop the flow of drugs through the St. Louis airport); United States v. 
                     
0If he had been kneeling, as Small testified he had been, his legs would have stuck out 
approximately 18 inches into the hallway.  That would have left other people in the 
corridor with less than 12 inches to pass without touching Small.  And if he had been five 
to six inches from the doorway, he would have left other passengers with only six to seven 
inches to pass.  Again it is likely that they would have had to step over at least some 
part of Small's body when they passed Kim's roomette and there is nothing on the tape 
indicating in any way that they did.  Unless people on the train from Los Angeles have 
worse manners than average people, or are more nimble and svelte, one would have expected 
something on the tape where the passing passengers acknowledged Small's presence.  There 
is nothing of the kind on the tape. 
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Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1988) (seizure in an airport occurred when a DEA 
agent told defendant that he was "working narcotics" and asked to look in the bag), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).0
                     
0
 Both Nunley and Gonzales were airport cases.  In each case, the encounter 
occurred in the airport terminal, a non-cramped and public place where it would have been 
quite easy for the defendant to walk away.  They are therefore much weaker cases than this 
one, where similar questions were asked to a defendant who was trapped in the confined 
space of the roomette.  As I see it, if it is true that a seizure occurred where similar 
questions were asked to a defendant in a public setting, then it must be the case that a 
seizure would have occurred where such questions were asked in a cramped and confined 
setting. 
 The majority comments in a footnote that "the dissent has cited to several cases 
decided in or before 1990 prior to Bostick (1991) for a proposition contrary to the 
Bostick language [that police may ask potentially incriminating questions without 
converting an encounter into a seizure].  Those cases also conflicted with Little."  Maj. 
Op. at 15 n.6.  I see no conflict between Bostick and either Nunley or Gonzales.  Both 
cases employ the same totality of the circumstances approach endorsed in Bostick.  
873 F.2d at 185; Gonzales, 842 F.2d at 748. 
Apparently the majority believes that the language from the Bostick case makes the 
question whether focused and incriminating questions were asked irrelevant to the totality 
of the circumstances inquiry.  I see nothing in the language of Bostick that leads to such 
a conclusion.  Bostick merely says that police may approach a person and ask potentially 
incriminating questions without necessarily converting the encounter into a seizure.  It 
does not follow from such a proposition that asking incriminating questions is irrelevant 
to the question of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the 
encounter. 
 Indeed, a number of post-Bostick cases recognize that asking incriminating 
questions -- like asking a person whether he or she is carrying drugs -- is relevant to 
the question whether a person was seized.  See, e.g., United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 
1270, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that one relevant consideration is whether the police 
indicate through their questioning that they were a specific target, like asking whether 
they are carrying drugs); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing as relevant to the seizure analysis whether the police asked the defendant 
whether he was carrying drugs, and explaining United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th 
Cir. 1985), which held that it is relevant to the seizure question whether the officer 
informs an individual that he is conducting a drug investigation and then asks the 
individual if he has drugs in his possession), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2947 (1993); 
United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1991) (persistent questioning, 
even when polite, by itself, created a seizure).  Wilson is particularly noteworthy 
because in that case there were no coercive elements of the encounter other than the 
questioning the police.  The panel in that case could not have reached its result if 
asking incriminating questions was irrelevant to the inquiry. 
 Thus the majority's claim that the dissent ignores Bostick is misplaced.  
Properly construed, Bostick allows courts to consider the incriminating nature of the 
questioning as one part of the totality of the circumstances.  And this conclusion is 
fully consistent with post-Bostick case law.  
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 Furthermore, not only did the questioning seek to incriminate Kim, but the 
questions were also blunt and direct. Although the majority dismisses the importance of 
this fact by stating that Small's tone was polite and conversational, that response misses 
the point.  Bluntness and directness describe the type of questions asked, not the manner 
in which they were asked. See, e.g., Nunley, 873 F.2d at 184-85 (not even mentioning 
whether the officer's tone was confrontational or rude to the defendant).  Although the 
tone of the officer's voice is relevant to the extent that a forceful tone of voice may 
make a reasonable person think that they must comply with the officer's requests, see
United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the lack of such a forceful 
tone does not entirely deprive blunt and direct questions of their coercive force.  The 
questions Small asked Kim about citizenship and drug trafficking were as sharp and 
focussed as they could be under the circumstances, given that Small had absolutely no 
articulable suspicion that any crime had been committed, let alone that Kim had committed 
a crime. 
 Finally, it is undisputed that Small failed to advise Kim of his right to 
decline the agent's requests or terminate the encounter.  The majority dismisses this fact 
as unimportant stating that "[w]hile such advice may well be evidence of the consensual 
nature of an encounter following the advice, the absence of such advice does not 
necessarily eliminate the consensual nature of the encounter."  This statement is typical 
of the majority's approach to this case.  The majority examines each fact of the encounter 
in isolation and considers whether each fact, by itself, would have made a reasonable 
person believe he was not free to terminate the encounter.  See Maj. Op. at 11 ("Nor do we 
believe a confined area in a train is inherently coercive"); Maj. Op. at 13 ("we do not 
believe that Kim's expectation of privacy [in the roomette] has any overriding importance 
in our analysis as to whether a seizure occurred"); Maj. Op. at 15 ("potentially 
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incriminating questions do not by themselves make an encounter coercive") (emphases 
supplied). 
 The clear implication of the majority's analysis in this case is that, unless 
the defendant can come forward with a piece of evidence that would make the encounter a 
per se seizure, the defendant will not be able to show that there was a seizure. In my 
opinion, such an approach transforms the "totality of the circumstances" analysis of 
Bostick into a mirror image of the per se approach rejected in Bostick.  Bostick teaches 
that a court must consider all of the evidence in combination to determine whether the 
circumstances were such that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the 
encounter.  The question whether one factor does or does not necessarily create a seizure 
is simply no longer relevant after Bostick.   
 Perhaps as a result of this failure to implement the Bostick standard, the 
majority fails to recognize that although Small's failure to advise Kim that he had a 
right to terminate the encounter may not by itself create a seizure, it nevertheless could 
tip the balance under a true totality of the circumstances analysis.  This is particularly 
true in this case because the circumstances are otherwise so similar to Bostick.  Of 
critical, and perhaps decisive, importance in Bostick was the fact that the two police 
officers questioning Bostick on the bus had "specifically advised Bostick that he had the 
right to refuse consent."  111 S. Ct. at 2385, 2388.  If we believe that Bostick 
represents a case in which the actions of the police were almost coercive enough to amount 
to a seizure, the absence of such a warning in a situation similar to that in Bostick
should be enough to tip the balance.   
 In sum, given that the setting was non-public and that Small was asking Kim and 
Youn incriminating questions while blocking the door to the roomette, Small's failure to 
advise Kim that he could terminate the encounter made the encounter a seizure.  I believe 
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that no reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter under such 
circumstances.0 
 II. THE SCOPE OF CONSENT 
 Even if Small did not seize Kim prior to his search of the luggage, Small's 
search of the sealed vegetable protein canisters he found within the luggage violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the scope of the consent.0  As the majority mentions, 
Small asked to search Kim's bag and Kim said he could.  Small then saw six metal-lidded, 
factory-sealed canisters labelled "Naturade All-Natural Vegetable Protein." Without asking 
Kim's permission, and after Kim told Small that they were meant to be a present, Small 
opened the factory seal and handed the canister to Candelaria asking him to poke around 
inside the can to see what he could find.  The question is whether Small reasonably 
                     
0Of course, Small's seizure of Kim would not violate the Fourth Amendment if he had 
reasonable suspicion to detain him. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. 
Ct. 1581 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).  Small did not, 
however, have reasonable suspicion.  At the time Small asked Kim whether he had drugs in 
his luggage (the time that I believe the seizure occurred because by this time the 
encounter was not only in a cramped, non-public space, but had involved focused and 
incriminating questioning), Small knew the following facts:  1) Kim and Youn had purchased 
one-way tickets; 2) the tickets were purchased for cash; 3) they had upgraded to a sleeper 
car en route from Los Angeles; 4) they were travelling to Philadelphia; 5) Kim was a 
naturalized citizen born in Korea; 6) Youn was in the U.S. Marines; 7) Youn's ticket was 
in the name of "Terry Park" (there is no evidence that Small knew that this was an alias 
at the time of the encounter, however); and (8) the train manifest had the name "Wonz"
assigned to the sleeper. These facts are all consistent with innocent travel, and they 
fall woefully short of the particularized suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop.  
Compare United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1993) (reasonable suspicion exists 
when the defendant matched the standard profile for drug couriers, was using a false name, 
rented a car for only a few hours before returning it, appeared nervous and highly 
agitated, and was traveling with two recognized drug traffickers).            
0
  The majority addresses the question whether Kim voluntarily consented to Small's search 
of his luggage and concludes that Kim did so consent.  It then concludes that "the 
district court was correct in finding that Kim voluntarily consented to the search of his 
luggage."  I am not entirely sure why the majority has chosen to undertake this particular 
consent analysis.  Kim apparently concedes that, absent a seizure, his consent to search 
the luggage (though not the sealed container) was voluntarily given.  Of course, if there 
was an improper seizure, Kim's consent to the search of the luggage pursuant to that 
improper seizure was involuntary, absent a break in the causal chain. Apparently, the 
majority concedes that there was no break in causation between Small's initial encounter 
with Kim and his search of the bag.  Thus, if the seizure was improper, the fruits of the 
search should have been suppressed. 
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believed that Kim's consent to search his luggage gave Small permission to open the 
canisters.  The majority holds that it did.  I disagree. 
 We know from Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991), that the 
scope of a search is defined objectively and that under such an approach a suspect's 
general consent to search a car includes consent to search a folded paper bag lying on the 
floor of the car.  111 S. Ct. at 1804.  But we also know that consent to search a larger 
container does not include consent to search all smaller containers inside.  Id.  As 
Jimeno itself stated, "[i]t is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by 
consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked 
briefcase within the trunk."  Id. (citing State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1989)). Each 
officer in Jimeno, Wells, and this case requested consent to search for narcotics; thus 
the defendant in each case consented under similar contexts, making the scope of their 
consent similar.  Hence the question ultimately posed by this case is whether the factory 
sealed canister is more like a locked briefcase or a folded paper bag.0 
 The majority's entire discussion of this question is as follows: "cans such as 
found in the case sub judice are not similar to locked briefcases."  That is simply a 
conclusion. There is no discussion of the relevant differences between the two objects for 
purposes of the reasonable scope of a consent to search.  In my opinion, the difference 
between the folded paper bag in Jimeno and the locked briefcase in Wells has to do with 
the owner's greater expectation of privacy in the contents of the briefcase than in a 
                     
0The majority frames the issue as a matter of whether or not the canisters reasonably 
could have contained drugs.  It frames the issue in this way because it abstracts from 
Jimeno the proposition that when an officer requests permission to search for drugs and 
such permission is given, "the permission extends to any items within that area that a 
reasonable person would believe to contain drugs."  Such a reading of Jimeno cannot be 
right.  Jimeno clearly states that it would have been "unreasonable" to think that a 
suspect consents to the search of a locked briefcase inside a car trunk when he consents
to search of a trunk.  Yet it certainly is reasonable to think that a locked suitcase in 
those circumstances contains drugs.   
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paper bag, and in the owner's greater property interest in not having the lock on his 
briefcase broken than in not having his paper bag opened. 
 I believe, however, that a heightened expectation of privacy can be evidenced by 
something other than a lock -- gift-wrapping around a package, for example.  Of course a 
sealed package like a can of food or a box with plastic shrink-wrap around it does not 
really evidence a strong privacy interest. Labels on products will often display 
prominently the contents of a package.  This is where the second distinction becomes 
important, however.  Consent to search property cannot reasonably be construed to mean 
consent to damage the property.  There is a strong property interest in sealed packages, 
and opening them often damages the value of that interest. 
 In my opinion, the Naturade All-Natural Vegetable Protein canister Small took 
from Kim's luggage was no different than a can of tuna fish, a carton of milk, or a locked 
briefcase, all of which would be seriously damaged once opened.  Once the seal was br
the canister simply would not be able to keep its contents free from spoilage to the same 
extent it could before.  And if it was meant to be a gift, as Kim told Small before he 
opened the lid, it would not be much good once opened. I believe it to be unreasonable for 
a police officer to think that consent to search luggage includes consent to open up a 
sealed package, particularly one that bears no visible evidence of tampering and which the 
officer has been told is going to be used as a gift. 
 Although the majority cites United States v. Springs, 936 F.2d 1330, 1334
(D.C. Cir. 1991), to support its conclusion that an officer can break into sealed 
containers during a consensual search, I do not believe Springs stands for this 
proposition.  In Springs, although the baby powder container had a lid (which the majority 
somewhat disingenuously calls a "seal"), there was no evidence in the opinion that the 
container was sealed in the sense that the baby powder had a factory vacuum seal covering 
its opening.  In fact, the baby powder container had pry marks on it suggesting that 
someone had already opened the container.  Id. at 1332.  Thus Springs really only holds 
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that a police officer can remove the lid of an obviously already opened container when he 
is looking for drugs. 
 Springs reached its conclusion in part by distinguishing the baby powder 
container from the locked briefcase discussed in Jimeno on two grounds: 1) the baby powder 
container did not have a key, and 2) opening the baby powder container would not render it 
useless.  For the reasons discussed above, neither distinction forecloses Fourth Amendment 
protection in this case.  First, as was mentioned above, although the locked nature of the 
briefcase is strong evidence of the owner's intent to keep its contents private, it does 
not follow that a key or lock is necessary for a box or container to be outside the scope 
of a consensual search of this kind.  Second, Springs' discussion of "useless[ness]" 
suggests agreement with the principle that consent does not reasonably extend to searches 
that will physically damage the property being searched.  As discussed above, when applied 
to the facts of this case, this principle suggests that Small exceeded the scope of Kim's 
consent. 
 It is becoming a shibboleth in this area of the law for courts to say that drugs 
are usually not scattered loosely throughout larger containers.  See, e.g., Jimeno, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1804; Springs, 936 F.2d at 1334-35.  I fully concede that it is appropriate for a 
police officer to look at smaller containers found in luggage that may possibly contain 
drugs.  But once the police officer has looked at the item and it is either wrapped or 
sealed, it is unreasonable for the police officer to think that the consent to search the 
luggage gives him license to damage the item by opening it without asking permission.
 I respectfully dissent. 
                     
0Moreover, before Small opened the canister, Youn said, "[i]ts closed."  I believe that a 
reasonable officer would take that to mean that he should not open the container.  The 
majority attempts to wave this problem away in part by stating that Youn's statement did 
not mean that Small should not open the canister but rather that he simply did not know 
what was in the canister. According to the majority, "Youn's answer was another way of 
saying, 'I don't know because it is closed.'"  But Youn did not say "I don't know because 
it is closed."  He said, "It's closed." 
16 
   
